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In this thesis, we address a multi-period cooperative investment problem with 
risk involved, analyzing the portfolio selection as well as the profit sharing 
rule among the investors. We choose a /qo risk measure and model the prob-
lem as a cooperative game with bicriteria objective, and prove the existence 
of the core. Then the problem with two periods is carefully studied. For its 
dual problem, an O(m^) scheduling type algorithm is provided to find the 
optimal solution, then based on this result, we solve the primal problem un-
der different cases. We also examine the relationship between the risk level 
of the group and the core of the game by tracing our the efficient frontier 
for the problem. For general multi-period problem, we first analyze how a 
group of investors each with concave utility function towards risk could agree 
on a common risk attitude and prove the existence of core under this case. 
A negotiation process is provided when the risk utility function is not well 
defined. Then we provide a modified simplex method to solve the dual prob-
lem when risk level is fixed, which not only can quickly find the core of the 
game, but also is useful for the negotiation process. For the multi-period 
problem with other risk measures, especially the downside and coherent risk 
measures, we prove the existence of the core. 
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The most important issue to be considered when people face an investment 
problem, is how to use the limited money to earn as much profit as possible. 
When people have some money available for investments, they will choose 
the investment portfolio with the highest profit. That is the case when we 
can exactly tell the profit of each project, such as deposits, some fixed income 
products, etc. However, most investment projects are subject to risks. That 
means in general one can not observe the exact profit before making invest-
ment decisions. Therefore, not only the profit, but also the risk should be 
considered while making decisions. Since there are huge number of projects 
available in the market, how to select a portfolio consisting of a set of projects 
to balance the expected value of profit and the level of risk exposure becomes 
the key issue of making investment decisions. 
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Another issue to be considered by the investors while making invest-
ment decisions is how to cooperate with other investors. Sometimes an in-
vestor may not have enough money/resources to invest in the most profitable 
projects. So they need to cooperate with each other to earn more revenue. 
Under the stochastic cases, cooperation with other investors can also benefit 
in sharing the risk. When considering the cooperative investment, a cooper-
ative game model has been formed, in which the key issues to be considered 
are whether a grand coalition can be formed and how they should split the 
return of the investment fairly. 
The investment problems are often divided into two kinds: single period 
investment problems and multi-period investment problems. For the single 
period problems, investors do not need to consider the reinvestment issue. 
While for multi-period problems, reinvestment should be considered and the 
relationship between one period and another may greatly affect the final 
investment decision. Thus the multi-period investment problems arc much 
more complicated than the one period problems. 
1.2 Aims and objectives 
The aim of this work is to investigate on how to make the cooperative invest-
ment decisions (how to select the investment portfolio) to generate high profit 
as well as control the overall risk under multi-period cases. First, we con-
sider the problem using the loo risk measure introduced by Cai Xiaoqiang[3], 
as well as consider the problem as a bi-criteria problem, which balance the 
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return and risk. To make sure the stability of the coalition, we focus on 
the revenue allocation scheme of the cooperative game, and we prove the 
existence of the core. After getting the general result for this multi-period 
problem, we carefully examine the problem under the two-period case. For 
the two-period problem, we not only examine the core of the game, but are 
also able to provide an analytical solution with an O(m^) time complexity 
algorithm to the problem, which extends the single period results of Cai 
Xiaoqiang[3]. Then we consider the problem in some other widely used risk 
measures, e.g. downside risk and CVAR, and establish the existence of the 
core. 
1.3 Outline of the thesis 
To study the multi-period cooperative investment problem, the following top-
ics have be investigated and covered in this thesis: 
Chapter 1 introduces the multi-period cooperative investment problem. 
The background of this problem and some past works are briefly introduced, 
and the aims and objectives of our work are defined in this chapter. 
Chapter 2 reviews the famous works that have been done in portfolio op-
timization area. The basic concepts of cooperative game theory are provided 
by reviewing the work of Shapley[16] and Owen [14]. Then we review some 
cooperative investment game models, like the deposit game by Borni[2] and 
general investment game by Aiija[18 . 
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Chapter 3 describes the cooperative investment problem we considered 
and presents our basic model. The assumptions and parameters are stated 
here and a proper risk measure is chosen. Then we prove the grand coalition 
can always be achieved and the core of the game always exists. 
Chapter 4 carefully studies our model under the two-period case. First 
we start with the dual problem. A series of algorithms with O(m^) time 
complexity are provided to find the optimal solution for the dual problem. 
Then using this dual optimal solution, we determine the core allocation of 
the game. 
Chapter 5 studies the primal problem under the two-period case. Using 
the results got in chapter 4, we solve the primal problem and get the opti-
mal solution of it via. a scheduling algorithm with time complexity. 
Meanwhile, we provide the entire possible region of the risk when achieving 
optimality. Furthermore, by tracing out the entire efficient frontier of our 
two-period problem, we study the relationship between the risk attitude of 
the coalition and the core of the game. 
Chapter 6 examines the general multi-period cooperative investment prob-
lem. Each investor has its own risk utility function, which is deceasing, con-
cave, and differentiable. We prove that for any group, they can always reach 
a common risk price and transform the objective function of the group to a, 
linear function. Besides, even when the risk utility function for each investor 
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is not well defined, we can also get the common price through negotiation 
process. Furthermore, we provide a modified simplex method which can be 
used to locally trace out the return-risk frontier by solving the dual LP prob-
lem for fixed risk level, and it can be used in the negotiation process. 
Chapter 7 establishes the existence of core allocation for other risk mea-
sures, e.g. Downside risk measure and CVaR. Our contribution is on show-
ing how to formulate the problem with risk measures like downside risk or 
CVaR into infinite dimension linear programming by introducing some arti-
ficial variables, and apply the strong duality theory for infinite dimension LP 
problems. Therefore, we extend our model to infinite dimension/stochastic 
case. 
Chapter 8 summarizes the main results of this thesis and gives recom-
mendations for further research and studies on this multi-period cooperative 
investment problem. 




2.1 Portfolio Optimization Problems 
The study of portfolio optimization problem is of long history. One of the 
most famous works done in the early years was the mean-variance (M-V) 
model and the efficient frontier theory by Markowitz[12], which is considered 
to be the foundation and main structure of the well-known Modern Portfolio 
Theory (MPT). Markowitz defines investment risk into quantitative terms, 
and builds up models which provide investors a mathematical approach to 
solve portfolio selection and management problems. However, his model is 
based on some assumptions: 1) the variance of return is the correct measure 
of investment risk, and 2) investment returns of all projects and portfolios 
can be represented by normal distribution. These two assumptions do not 
always match the realities of the market. So Markowitz's M-V model is not 
widely used in the industry. 
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From then on, many works have been focusing on this area. In 1987，a 
series of practical mathematical algorithms were developed as Post Modern 
Portfolio Theory (PMPT). These methods provide a framework that recog-
nizes investors' preferences for upside over downside volatility. At the same 
time, a more robust model for the pattern of investment returns, the three-
parameter lognormal distribution, was introduced. 
Many other works have been done considering different risk measures, 
such as VaR, CVaR, etc. Cai et al. [3] provide a portfolio selection method 
under ininimax rule, which introduces a new /qo risk measure as the maximum 
individual risk and build up a model with a bi-criteria objective function. In 
that paper, a scheduling based greedy algorithm with conservative selection 
rule is proposed to solve analytic solutions of the problem, and to trace out 
the efficient frontier. The relationship between the efficient frontier and the 
different range of risk-return trade off parameter A are established. Also, 
behavior of the problem with the inclusion of the riskless assets is analyzed. 
Following Cai et al. [3]，s work, numerous researches have been done on 
this ininimax type risk measure as an stochastic decision problem as well as 
in stochastic game environment, for example, see, Deng et al. [19]. These 
works dealt with problems of all sorts, including immunization problems, 
minimizing the maximmn regret with a fixed level of return, making portfolio 
decisions as games, minimizing the maximum level risk among all the assets, 
etc. Some even provide analytic Arrow-Debreu type equilibrium price system. 
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2.2 Cooperative Games and Cooperative In-
vestment Models 
There are different kinds of investment opportunities available in the market 
place. Besides, there are also large numbers of investors in the market search-
ing for investment opportunities. So when investors want to invest in some 
projects, they often find themselves facing a cooperative investment problem. 
Lemaire[ll], Izquierdo and Rafels[10] consider the model in which a group 
of investors mutually invest in a single period deposit, for which the revenue 
is increasing with the amount of money invested in it. They study the prob-
lem of how revenue should be redistributed among the investors in order to 
induce stable cooperation. Borm et al.[2] consider a multi-period model in 
which investors can invest in different types of deposits, and provide a game 
theoretical analysis on how to allocate the jointly earned benefits. Anja De 
Wacgenaere et al.[18] discuss a multi-period cooperative investment problem 
and prove that there is a stable sharing rule of the game, which means that 
the core of the game must exist. If there are some integer constraints, they 
also prove the existence of the core under some conditions. Most of the mod-
els above have used cooperative game theory to solve investment problems. 
So in this section, we first introduce some basic concepts of cooperative game 
theory by reviewing one of the most famous linear cooperative game model 
called “ Linear Production Games", which is introduced by Owen[14]. Then 
we give a brief review of the research done in investment area, using this kind 
of linear cooperative game model. 
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2.2.1 Linear Production Games And Basic Concepts 
of Cooperative Game Theory 
Cooperative game theory has been a hot research topic during recent years. 
Many problems in manufacture, transportation and other areas can be mod-
eled as cooperative game problems. One of the most famous cooperative 
game model was introduced by G. Owen (1975) [14]. In this paper, Owen 
studies a kind of cooperative game named Linear Production Games, in which 
there is a fixed, finite set A^  = {1, 2 , . . . , n} of players and each of them holds 
a set of resources. The resources in themselves are not valued but they could 
be used to produce goods which can be sold at a given market price. Dif-
ferent products need different combination of resources to produce and have 
their own prices. However, the players may not hold the right combination 
of resources, so they have strong cooperative incentives to better organize 
their resources and achieve the highest value of the final goods. Under the 
static, deterministic case as described by Owen, each individual i e N seeks 
to solve a linear program 
maximize c • x 
subject to Ax < hi (2.1) 
X > 0 
where bi e R'^ is the resources vector of player i, c G R^ is the mar-
ket price of the goods, and Akxm = (%•) where aij is the units of the i仇 
resource, i G { 1 , 2 , . . . , A;}, required to produce one unit of the good, 
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j G { 1 , 2 , . . . , m}. All the parameters are assumed to be nonnegative, that 
is {ttij, bj, c > 0). 
Use v{i) to denote the optimal value of (2.1). Let 5 C A^  be a coalition 




Then the members of coalition S face the following coordinated linear 
program 
maximize c • x 
subject to Ax < bs (2-2) 
x > 0 
Let v(S) denote the optimal value of (2.2), which is called the character-
istic cost function with respect to the coalition set S. For such a cooperative 
game, we define the core of the game as follows: 
Definit ion 1. The core of a cooperative game is defined as 
n 
{(c^i, •..，叫)| 叫 > 0’ Y^uJi = v{N), Y^uji > v{S),yS C N) 
t=i ies 
A core-allocation distributes the value of the grand coalition N in such a 
way that each subcoalition receives at least as much as they can obtain on 
their own. Since this implies that no coalition has an incentive to part from 
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the grand coalition, a core-allocation induces stable cooperation. 
After we define the cooperative game and its core, the following questions 
rise naturally for the linear production games: How many of those investors 
will join the coalition? How should they share the profit? Owen [14] gives a 
constructive answer to the above two questions. 
Theorem 1. (Owen) The linear production game [N,v) is balanced，thus 
has a non-empty core. Moreover, consider the grand coalition S = N and 
suppose y* is the optimal solution of the dual problem 
minimize bjsj • y 
subject to A^y > c 
2 / > 0 
then { ( c j i , . . . := hjy*, Vi G N), belongs to the core. That means 
' " � VS C N, and E Ui 三 v{N) 
ies ieN 
Owen's result not only shows that the grand coalition always forms, but 
also provides a way to calculate the core of the linear production games. 
Heuristically, the dual optimal solution {y*/y2, • • • ^Vl} can be viewed as 
equilibrium prices for the k kinds of resources. Each of the players is paid 
according to the resources he provides using the equilibrium price vector y*, 
then the resulting payments will always yield a vector in the core of the 
original game. 
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2.2.2 Investment Models Using Linear Production Ga-
mes 
Every linear production game includes a linear program which has the fol-
lowing characters: l)the objective function is linear; 2) the constraints are 
linear; 3) all the variables are non-negative. Then the main research focus 
is how to split the earning. Many investment problems can be modeled sim-
ilarly. Each investment project has its own return. And the investment in 
each project is nonnegative. The objective of any coalition of investors is to 
maximize their total profit. To achieve higher profit, they may pool their 
capital together and form a coalition. When the projects are finished, the), 
share the total profit and everybody is satisfied. In the rest part of this 
section, a brief review summarizes works that have been done in this area, 
including cooperative game in capital deposits ([2]) and cooperative game in 
general investments ([18]), etc. 
Cooperat ion in capital deposits 
Generally, people save part of their incomes during their lives to better deal 
with future expenses. Instead of leaving them at home, people would like 
the savings to be deposited at a bank to get some additional earnings. The 
rate of return banks offer for the deposit depends on the amount of money 
invested in it and the term of the deposit. Banks usually offer a higher 
interest rate for a longer term deposit, i.e. there is a so-called term structure 
of interest rates which implies that investors would prefer long term deposits 
to short term ones. Besides, banks offer a higher interest rate as the amount 
12 
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of money increases. So if investors have capitals available in different periods, 
they can cooperate with each other to form a longer term and larger amount 
deposit, thus to achieve higher rate of return. Borm[2] considers a finite 
time horizon consisting of a number of periods during which individuals have 
certain amounts of money that are available for depositing. There are a 
number of deposits offered by the banks. Each of them generates revenues 
depending on the term and amount of the deposit. Then the following issues 
are prominent. First, what is the optimal strategy for choosing the deposits. 
Second, what is the acceptable allocation for the earnings. To deal with 
the problem, Bonn models the situation as a cooperative game, called a 
deposit game. In this game, the value of a coalition equals the maximum 
revenue this group can earn by pooling their savings together. To study 
this game, the authors separate the deposit games to three subclasses, called 
term dependent deposit games, capital dependent deposit games, and fixed 
term deposit games. For each class of deposit games, they provide necessary 
conditions for a nonempty core, and then examines the allocation rules. 
Cooperat ion in general investments 
For general investment projects, the investment problems can also been mod-
eled as cooperative games. Charnes and Cranot[4] consider a type of coop-
erative games for which the value of any coalition S, v{S) is allowed to be a 
stochastic variable. They provide a way to allocate the stochastic payoff of 
the grand coalition in two stages. In the first stage, the agents are promised 
to achieve the so called prior payoffs for which there is a good chance to be 
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realized. Then after the random value of the coalition has been observed, it 
may not be able to make the initial payoffs offered. So in the second stage, 
the payoffs to the players are modified in some way so as to be acceptable or 
raise “ least" objection among the players. This idea is further explained in 
Charlies and Cranot (1976) [5] and Cliarnes and Cranot (1977) [6]. Suijs[17 
introduces a class of cooperative games in a stochastic environment where 
the preferences are of a specific type. Using Farka's lemma, they prove that 
for specific classes of games, the core is non-empty if and only if the game is 
balanced. 
There is also some research focusing on nnilti-period problems. Anja De 
Waegenaere[18] discussed a. multi-period cooperative investment problem. 
Each of the projects has a fixed capital requirement and fixed return in each 
period. When there is no limitation on the amount of money invested in each 
of the projects, they prove that there is a stable sharing rule of the game. 
If there are some integer constraints, they also prove that the core is non 




Investment Games: Basic 
Model 
Consider a finite number of T periods. A set of investors TV 二 {1，2,..., n} 
want to enroll in the investment. Each investor i ^ N has a series of money 
available during those periods: 
Bi = (Bii,战 2 , . . . ’ B.iT) G RT 
The budget B^ can be used for current consumption or kept for future con-
sumption. For convenience, we assume the discount rate is 1 and we as-
sume that Bit > 0，for all i e N. There is a set of investment projects 
M = {1,2，...，m}. Each investment project j e M is described by a pair of 
15 
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parameters {D, R)^ G R+ x R^, where 
( 
Djt, initial endowment per unit in project j at the start of period t; 
< 
Rjt, revenue per unit of project j received at the start of period t. 
\ 
Based on the capital constraints and some partial information of the re-
turn rate of each project, the investors have to make the decision about which 
projects they want to choose and how much money they want to invest in 
each of them. They also have to agree on a profit sharing rule which they 
will follow to split the profit after it is observed. 
3.1 Cooperative Investment Game under De-
terministic Case 
Anja (2005) examined this problem under deterministic case. In his paper, 
the capital requirement and return {Djt, Rjt), t = 1,…，T, j = 1,..., M 
are fixed and known to all before the investment decisions are made. The 
revenues can be reinvested in the following periods. Thus only the return of 
the last period needs to be considered. The objective of any sub-coalition 
5 C N" is to maximize their total profit in the last period, condition on that 
for each period, the total capital of the sub-coalition is enough for those 
16 
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projects. Thus the TU-game (5, v) is obtained with 
m 
v{S) = max ^ Xji^jT — Djr) + ^ Bit 
j=i ies 
m 
s.t. - ^ Xj (Rjt - Djt) < ^ Bit 力=1, 2’...，T, 
j=i ies 
Xj G M+ j = 1’ 2，... ’ k, 
Xj 6 N j = A: + 1，/c + 2,...，rn 
for all S C N. 
The core of the game (TV, v) is defined as 
c{v) = {uje M ^ l ^ c J i = v(N), and VS C N : > ” 
iGN ieS 
For the case with integer constraints, the a-core of the game {N, v) is 
defined by 
= {uje M ^ l ^ c J i = v(N), and V5 ^ iV : Y^Ui > av{S)} 
ieN ies 
which states that each subcoalition S C N, S ^ N, must receive at least a 
proportion a of what they can obtain on their own. Let v(S) denotes the 
linear program v{S) without any integer restrictions, and g{S) = mea-
sures the duality gap. 
To solve this problem, the author interprets {N, v) as a linear production 
17 
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game in the sense of Owen (1975). Owen shows that linear production games 
without integer restrictions have a nonempty core. Besides, the optimal 
solution of the dual problem can be used to derive a specific core-allocation. 
Following this, Anja gets the following results. 
Theorem 2. (Anja) 
• The investment game (N, v) has a nonempty a-core for all a that satisfy 
a < niins^N "織. 
• The core c(v) of an investment game {N, v) is nonempty if g(N)= 
maxscN 9{S). 
3.2 Cooperative Investment Game with Stoc-
hastic Return 
3.2.1 Basic Assumptions 
111 this section we move to the stochastic case. The investors' budget B ^ s 
are known and can be cumulated to the following periods if not invested in 
the current period t. The return Rjt's are stochastic variables and mutually 
independent with each other, which means each investment project is sub-
ject to certain risks. Investors have to make their investment decisions before 
observing the realized return of the projects. The objective is to maximize 
the expected profit as well as to minimize the risk, so investors may cooper-
ate with each other not only to achieve higher profit, but also to pool their 
18 
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risk. We first follow Anja's way to model our problem as a linear production 
game and choose the proper risk measure for our model, then we prove the 
existence of the core under the chosen risk measure in both single-period and 
multi-period cases. 
Since investors can not observe the return when they make the invest-
ment decisions, it is hard to consider reinvestment of the former return. So 
we assume that the returns can not be reinvested in the following periods. 
T 
Then the total return of any project j is simply ^ Fiji. The number of units 
‘ t=i ‘ 
invested in each project at the beginning of period 1 can be any positive 
real number. Assume Xj > 0) is the number of units we invest in project 
j at period 1, then we need Xj x Djt amount of money on project j at period t. 
For each period, the cash requirement of the selected projects must be 




J•二 1 ies 
771 T 丁 
^ DE 战 
j=i 1=1 ies 1=1 
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So the feasible region for the investment portfolio is 
m t t 
n^) = XjDji sY^Y^Bu 
j=i 1=1 ies 1=1 
for t = 1 , 2 , . . . , T } 
3.2.2 Choose the Proper Risk Measure 
In our problem, we consider the case when the investment projects are risky, 
which requires a proper risk measure to quantify the risk of each project and 
the risk of the portfolio. There are different kinds of risk measures that have 
been used to describe the risk of investment projects. The most common one 
is the Variance, which is used in Markowitz's Mean-Variance model. Another 
widely used risk measure is VaR. Given some confidence level a, the VaR of 
the portfolio is given by the smallest number I such that the probability that 
the loss L exceeds I is not larger than (1 — a): 
VaRa = mf{/ G M : P(L > /) < 1 - a } 
= i n f { / € R : FiXl) > a} 
In probabilistic terms VaR is a quantile of the loss distribution. In 1959, 
Markowitz[12] first introduced the downside risk measure "Semivariance". 
During 1970's, Bawa[l] and Fishburn[8] introduced another class of downside 
risk measure, Lower Partial Moment (LPM). For more detailed information 
of downside risk measure, refer to Nawrocki[13] for a brief review. During the 
last decade, a new risk measure called CVaR drawed much attention, mostly 
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because it is a coherent risk measure, which satisfies some general axioms 
adopted by many investors about what a proper risk measure should satisfy. 
Also, it matches exactly with the concept of VaR under normal distribution, 
and can be considered as generalization of VaR. Furthermore, CVaR is a 
convex risk measure, which makes it a much easier tool to quantify risks in 
optimization models. 
Ill 2000 Cai [3] introduced a new loo risk measure which can be expressed 
as 
roo{x) = ma.x E{\RjXj — rjXj\) 
This risk measure considers the maximum risk of the individual projects. 
For any investor, he wants to minimize the total risk of the investment portfo-
lio. But it may be the case that one of the investment projects is significantly 
risky than other projects in the portfolio, thus this individual project may 
cause great loss of the portfolio. The l^ o risk measure provides control of risk 
for every individual project, thus avoids the case mentioned above. So it is 
a proper risk measure for investment problem. In our model, we choose this 
risk measure to determine the risk of our portfolio. 
3.2.3 One Period Case 
Using the loo risk measure, Cai considers a investment problem which includes 
one player and m projects within one period, and therefore he formulates 
the problem as a bi-criteria portfolio optimization problem which tends to 
minimize the maxiimmi risk for each selected project as well as to maximize 
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total expected return. He derives the optimal solution in an explicit form, 
studies the properties of the solution, and examines the frontier of expected 
return against risk. If we consider a cooperative game with similar settings, 
The total budget is denoted by Ms for group S, and the expected return 
for project j is r�=E{Rj). Let qj — E{\Ri — r^l) represents the risk of 
project j, and we suppose all qj > 0, which means that we do not include 
risk-free projects in our portfolio. According to the result of Geoffrion[9], the 
bi-criteria problem can be modeled as for any group S C N, the problem 
faced by S is PO (A) : 
m 
v{S) = max —Xy + (1 — A) ^ TjXj 
s.t. QjXj < y j = 1, 2 , . . . , m 
m 
J2xj = Ms 
•7 = 1 
Xj > 0 j = 1, 2 , . . . , m. 
for A G (0,1). 
Similar results can be achieved as Cai[3] on the optimal solution and 
efficient frontier of the problem PO (A). Additional results about the core of 
the game can be derived from the dual problem of PO (A). In conclusion, we 
have the following results: 
Theorem 3. The grand coalition of the one-period cooperative investment 
game PO (A ) can always hold, and the game has a non-empty core. 
The proof of this theorem is similar to the proof under multi-period case, 
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thus we omit the proof here. 
3.2.4 Multi-Period Case 
Under multi-period cases, each project has its capital requirement at the 
beginning of each period. The capital left in one period can be transferred 
to the following periods for investment. So the feasible region of the miilti-
t 
period problem is T { S ) as denoted in the previous section. Let Bl = ^ Bu 
1=1 
t 
and Dj = Djt, the feasible region can be written as /=i 
m 
H'S) == {Xj\xj > 0 , ^ x^D] < Y , Bl for 亡二 1，2，... ’ T } 
3=1 ies 
Similar to one period case, we can model the multi-period cooperative 
investment problem for any group S as 
m 
v(S) = max —\y + (1 — A) ^ VjXj 
j=i 
S,t, QjXj < y = 1’ 2，...，772 
m 
j=i ies 
y > 0, Xj > 0 j = 1,2, . . . , m . 
T T 
for A G (0，1). Here rj = ^ rjt and qj = ^ E\rjt — Rjt\ are both cumulated 
t=l ‘ i=l 
amounts. 
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s.t. YJ D\zt + qjU^j > (1 - \)rj j = 1,2,... ,m 
(3.1) m 
E Uj < A 
Zt, Uj > 0 t = 1 , . . . , T; j = 1 ,2 , . . . , rn. 
From the dual problem, we can see that the feasible region of the dual 
problem has no relationship with S. Besides, the objective function is increas-
ing with S since Bg are all increasing with respect to S and Zt > 0 for all 
t. Thus the optimal value of the dual problem increases with S, so as the 
optimal value of the primal problem. Therefore, it can also be proved that 
the grand coalition can always be achieved. And the core allocation can be 
derived by the optimal solution of the dual problem. In conclusion, we have 
the following result: 
Theorem 4. The grand coalition for multi-period cooperative investment 
game under loo risk measure can always hold, and the game has a non-empty 
core. More over, if the optimal solution of the dual problem is {z^,..., z^], 
then the core of the game lo 二 (u^i,.,. ’ c a n be expressed as 
T 
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Proof. For tOi defined as above, we obviously have 
> 0 
= Ef：彻 
1=1 i=l t=l 
=Ef>&f>“r 
t=i 1=1 t=i 
Besides, since the feasible region has no relationship with the coalition S, the 
optimal solution for the dual problem for the grand coalition remains feasible 
for any sub-coalition problem. Therefore 
T 
ies t=i 
From the definition of core, we know uj is in the core of the game. • 
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Game under Loo Risk Measure 
4.1 The Two Period Model 
During the last chapter, the multi-period cooperative investment game has 
been generated under the /qo risk measure. To solve this problem, we first 
start with the two-period case. During this chapter, we try to analyze this 
two-period problem from its dual problem. We first prove the existence of 
the core, then an algorithm is provided to find the optimal solutions of the 
dual problem, thus we can achieve the optimal value of the original problem 
and find the core of the game. 
Our two-period model with the same /qo I'isk measure can be formulated 
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v[S, A) = max —\y + (1 — A) ^ VjXj 
s.t. QjXj < y j — 1, 2 , . . . , 'm 
m 
E D)工j < Bl 
m 
E Dh < 瑪 
Xj > 0 j = 1，2’... ’m. 
where qj = XlLd E\Rjt — Vjt\ is the total risk for project j . 
This problem is equivalent to the following problem POG(A) : 
A 爪 
A) = max - j — + ^ 





x'j > 0 j = 1，2’... ’ m. 
We see the equivalence by directly letting x' = (1 — 入 a n d '以'二（1 — X)y. 
For this model, we start with considering its dual and then proceed to discuss 
some special properties about the core of this game. 
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The dual of the LP problem is as: 
niin (1 - + BIz2) 
s.t. D]zi + Dh2 + QjUj > Tj j = 1,2,... ,m 
(4.1) 
Zi,Z2,Uj > 0 j = 1,2,... ,m. 
Assuming qj > 0，the above can reformulate as the following POGD ( A ) : 
mill ( l - X ) ( B l z i + Dlz2) 
s-t. ZJLi ( 〜 ) ： 巧 ^ ^ (4.2) 
2：1，2；2 > 0. 
Lemma 1. The two linear programs J^.l and have the same optimal 
solution for (21,2:2)，and the same optimal value. 
Proof. Note the optimal value of the first and second problem as V^ and V2, 
respectively. If (21,22, u) is an optimal solution for the problem 4.1, then for 
each j € Af, from Djzi + D^Z2 + QjUj > 7) we know that uj > "二 产-• 
Since Uj > 0，it follows that Un > (『）d.zi~d.z2) , Therefore, we have 
J — ‘ J — qj ‘ 
曼 ( r 广 必 〈 亡 丄 
— Qj ~ ^ ' - 1 - A j = l -‘ .7 = 1 
Since the problem 4.2 has exactly the same objective as 4.1，then 
Vi = (1 - + BsaZ2) > � , 2 . 
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If Z2) is an optimal solution for the problem 4.2, then define u'^  = 
( J •二j 卢），it follows directly that u'j > 0 and < Further-
more, for any j G Af, observe that 
r — r)i — r)2 — 
D]z\ + + 力 > Dj^； + + q厂广广 f j 2 = r,-
Qj 
Therefore, z'^, u') forms a feasible solution for problem 4.1. It follows that 
V2 = [I-X){Bs,iz[^Bs,2z'2)> Vi-
lli consliision, it must be the case that Vi = V2. Thus for any optimal 
solution of problem 4.1 (2i，22，w), we have 
Vl = ( l - X)(Bs,lZ, + BS,2Z2) = V2 
which means (zi, Z2) is also the optimal solution of problem 4.2 since it 
achieves the optimal value of the problem. Thus we can conclude that there 
is a one to one correspondence between the optimal solution of problem 4.1 
and problem 4.2. • 
From the result of multi-period cooperative investment problem intro-
duced in last chapter, we have the following theorem. 
Theorem 5. The grand coalition of the two-period cooperative investment 
game can always be achieved. And the core of the game POG ( A ) can be 
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written as lu = ... ,cJn}，where 
Thus in the following part, we only consider the grand coalition. 
Now we begin to analyze the algorithms used to solve problem 4.2 in the 
case of grand coalition. Since the original dual problem is a LP problem, it 
can be solved by software in at least time. But for the two-period case, 
noticing the special structure of the problem, we can use some scheduling 
type algorithms to speed up the procedure of finding the optimal solution. 
To avoid ambiguity, we consider the projects that have the same budget 
requirements, expected return and expected risk as the same project. That 
means there do not exist project i and j, which satisfy: 
D-ii = Dji, Di2 = Dj2, n = Tj, Qi = Qj 
Further more, we first consider the case that for each project j, Dj: > 0 and 
Dj2 > 0. It's easy to observe that the feasible region is convex, and moreover, 
the lower hull (which is, the points that do not dominate any other points 
in the feasible region) of this convex region is a piecewise linear continuous 
path. We prove this argument by the following lemma. 
Lemma 2. Note the feasible region of problem 4-2 as we can obtain the 
following properties: 
1. Q. is a convex region. 
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2. Define the lower hull of the feasible region i飞 as LH[i1) = [z E VL, s.t. 
B{z)r\n 二 0}，where B(z) = {z' e R^^.z' < z} is defined to be all 
points strictly dominated by z. Then LH[i1) is exactly the set 
j=l 
which is a piecewise linear path. 
3. The path P()C) induces a convex piecewise linear function Zi = h{z2). 
Proof. We assume 0 ^ Q because otherwise the whole problem is trivial with 
optimal solution at Zi = Z2 = 0. 
1. Let lj{zuz2) = - ^ ^ and lj{zi,Z2) = — ^ . I j is a 
convex function of The convexity of 0 directly follows from 
the fact that 广^(之i，幻）is also a convex function of {zi, Z2). 
2. For any point in L/f�)，if [7=1 (”广巧二咖)+ = 占 — 〈 占 ， 
and > 0, then let z{ = {zi — D ] a n d 4 = (22 — 
S{J2T=i D � / ^ ) - i ) + . Since > 0, we know that z' G B(z). However, 
- ( r , - D]z[ -
h 仏 
< 亡 ( r j - D]z, - D^z^y I D]\z, 一 ,亡 D]\z, — 41 
j=i ^ j=i q:丨 j=i ^ 
< - + J + 
丄一A 
— A 
= r ^ -
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Zij 
j=l 1 一 儿 
Figure 4.1: Feasible region and the piecewise linear path 
Therefore, z' G Q. So z' € = {之}，when 5 � 0 ’ which 
is impossible. If Zi = 0, then because 0 g�2， it follows that Z2 > 0. 
Similar process can be applied for Z2 to prove contradiction. Therefore, 
we prove that LH[Q) C P(A). However, by the definition of P[X) we 
know that P(A) C LH{Q), consequently P(A) = LH{i1). 
From the definition of P(A), it's clearly a piece wise linear path. 
3. The convexity follows from the fact that set Q is the epigraph of func-
tion zi = h[Z2). Since the set Q is convex, the function h is a convex 
function. 
• 
The objective function of POGD (A ) is a linear function and increases 
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with Zi and 22, the optimal solution only can be obtained at one of the 
breakpoints or the whole interval between two adjacent breakpoints of P(入). 
So to solve the problem POGD ( A ) , we need to consider how many break-
points it has along the piecewise linear path P(A). For each point z € P(A), 
define the active set S{z) = { j | rj — D�zi — D�Z2 > 0}. The breakpoint 
indicates that the active set changes at the point. By the following theorem, 
we show that for POGD(入)，the piecewise linear path has at most 2m many 
breakpoints. 
Theorem 6. If we follow the path P{X) with z^ increasing, once an index 
j leaves the active set S{z), it will never return. Therefore the number of 
breakpoints (where the path P(A) changes direction) is at most 2m. 
Proof. Each breakpoint corresponds to a pair of (21, :2) where the value of 
lj{zi, Z2) = rj — D]zi — D'jZ2 changes sign for one or more j . If it happens 
that more than one Ij's change the sign at a breakpoint, we can just choose 
one to represent this point. Therefore, the breakpoint is the intersection of 
the convex path P(A) and some of the lines 
Lj = { (zuz2) I rj — D]zi — D]Z2 = 0} 
Since each line only has at most two intersection points with a convex path, 
there are at most 2m many breakpoints along the path. 
Also, if j G S{z) for certain j and z, it means the line Lj is above the path 
P(A) locally. Since P(A) is a convex path, all such z values for the same j is 
in a connected range, which means that once j leaves S{z) along the path, 
it will never return. 
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Zlt 
�zVzp 仏 0 
、 人 lj(zj,z,)>0 
一 ' s 
Figure 4.2: Example when active set changes 
• 
Since the path P(A) has only at most 2m many breakpoints, we can 
design a greedy method to follow the path and calculate all the breakpoints. 
Furthermore, since this path is independent to Bs,i and Bs,2, this process 
can be done by a central controller without knowing the exact information of 
each investor, which could speed up the decision greatly in some cases. Now 
we describe the algorithm of finding the breakpoints and consequently, the 
path P(A). 
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4.2 The Algorithm 
We first assume for each j, Dj > 0 and Dj > 0, we also assume that the 
slopes Wj = Dj / D j of Lj are sorted in increasing order, that is, Wi < W2 < 
uJs < W4 < . . . < Wm- Besides, to make sure the feasible region of the dual 
problem is non-empty, we have 
m. \ 
Also, from previous assumptions we know that there are no lines which co-
incide. In the following part we will discuss how to use algorithms to trace 
the path and identify the boundaries and all the breakpoints. The algorithm 
can be thought as a two phase decision. For each step, we first identify the 
breakpoint, they we proceed with a sub-algorithm to find the direction of the 
path to the next breakpoint or the boundary. We will begin with the main 
algorithm and then introduce the sub-algorithm subsequently. 
Algor i thm 1. Main 
Step 1 Initialization: Decide z 广 by solving the equation 
u ^ ^ ^ - 口 
Set k = 0, current slope of the path a—1 = 00. Decide z^ by solving the 
equation 
- ( r , - D ] z , y _ A 
^ Qj 
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Let the initial point be (zf, 0). 
Step 2 Decide the next slope a^ by the sub-algorithm SLOPE. 
Step 3 Let 
n = { j I > 0, D] — a'D] > 0}, 
and 
Let Uj = + zl for all the j indexes in set T = T+U^"- Let 
u = miii{wj I j e T}. 
Ifu > z�a�stop. 
If u < 之2職工，let k = k-\-l, z\ = u, z\ = — — z!). Go to 
Step 2. 
Remark 1. The previous theorem guarantees that this algorithm will ter-
minate within at most 2m + 1 iterations, and it will find all the breakpoints 
on the path from left to right (increasing order of ^2), therefore identifying 
the whole path P with two end points at and (0，2；『"”. 
Remark 2. At each breakpoint, after we decide the slope we know the 
direction where the path P(A) will go, then we need to know where it will 
stop, which is the next breakpoint. The next point is the nearest cross point 
(to the right hand side of the current point) of the path P(A) and any /厂 For 
any /j, if it has a cross point with the path with slope a � i t must fall in one 
of the two cases: 
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Zlt 
— … j i : 伙 “ 
、‘ 的 
Figure 4.3: Find the breakpoint of the path 
Case 1: Ij is above the path and has a steeper slope than which means 
Z2) > 0 and 奋〉a� 
Case 2: Ij is below the path and has a, flatter slope than which means 
Z2) < 0 and 哥 < 
These two cases correspond to T广 and T:. For each j G T广 U Tf，the cross 
point of Lj and the path should satisfy 
‘ 
- z\ = 一 4) 
< 
Tj - D]zi - D]z2 = 0 
v 
(7.(4'’ 4 ) , f^c A ,,, 
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The nearest cross point changes the direction of the path, so 之广= m i n { w j } 
if min{wj} < z'^ "'^ . If else, then the nearest cross point of Ij and the path is 
below the horizontal line, thus z^+i = 4 ^ ° � = 0. 
Now we describe the sub-algorithm which finds the slope of the path to 
the right of a breakpoint. 
Algor i t hm 2. The Sub-Algorithm: SLOPE 
The purpose of this sub-algorithm is to identify the slope a^ of the path P to 
the right of a breakpoint (^f, z^). 
Step 1 Define set A = { j : = 0} and B+ = { j : lj{zi, z^) > 0} and 
= { j ： < 0}. Suppose A = {ji, j2，• • • Jh} where h = 
and Wj^ < Wj2 < ... < Wj^. Note Wj^ = 0. 
Step 2 For i = Q to h，let set 
Ci = { j : j e A,Wj 
Step 3 Calculate 
,^jec.巧/力 
If hi e let cik = bi, stop. 
‘ '^ji+ilf let i = i + ，go to step 2. 
There is one and only one bi which is within range where 
'�jm+i = oo- Basically, this algorithm attempts h i- 1 possible sign com-
binations of /^'s in the formulation, and find the one and only one feasible 
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N . … J i ) = O(active) 
j b ‘ 1 2 1 - / 1 � . � . : : . � � j 2 : z ; ; ( z k ) = 0(inactive) 
. � ” 3 :/；；(》）= 0(inactive) 
一 Z2 
Figure 4.4: Determine the direction of the path 
representation. For each attempt, we assume the path will go in the direction 
between Wj. and Wj.^ ,^ then those Ij's above the direction will be bigger than 
0 within a small range on the right side of z^, so we calculate the direction 
of the path by combination of the slopes of these active / /s , then we test if 
it is really within the range {wj., Since the direction of the path is 
unique, we can only find one direction that satisfies the assumption. 
Remark 3. Since the path P(A) induces a convex function Zi = h{z2), it 
is easy to see that a^ is decreasing with k. That means for any breakpoint 
(zf, Z2), the slope of its right hand side is flatter than the slope of its left 
hand side, which means > a .^ Thus when we use the sub-algorithm to 
calculate a � w e only need to check the range above the original direction, 
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which means the slope a^ can only be in the range (0, . 
Using the above algorithms, we can obtain every breakpoint of the path 
P(X) gradually. Since both of the algorithms have no relationship with the 
budgets Bn’i and Bn’2, we can pre-calculate the path only by the informa-
tion of the available projects. Then when we get the budget information, we 
can quickly find the dual optimal solution and get a proper core allocation 
by our core definition. 
The above algorithms only cover the case that Dj > 0 and D'j > 0. But 
when the assumptions do not hold, we just need to do a few adjustments to 
make the algorithms work. 
Remark 4. For some j, D] = 0. In this case, we know that the corresponding 
Dj ^ 0, and lj = Vj — This can affect our algorithm in two ways. 
1. Yl^ jLi 二广)=do not have positive solution. Let Mi = = 
0}, a = Y1 3，then instead of solving ^ ^ ^ � � = Y ^ ， w e solve 
^ ( r ^ - D ] ^ A i > = -\-a 
^ Qj 1 - 入 
to get This case can be considered as that the path P is shift up 
from the horizontal axis. 
2. For D) = 0, I卞(z) = 0 is a vertical line in the (z2, zi) system. Thus 
lj have none or only one cross point with P. For any (2:1,22) G P , if 
22 < jji, > 0, else //(21,22) = 0. 
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For some j, if = 0, the effects are similar as D) = 0 . 
1. ( � — : ” ) + = ^ do not have solution. Let M2 = {JlD^ = ()}, 
P = Y^ then instead of solving (�一�尸。）二击，we solve 
jeA 'h — ^ 
h — 1 - A 
to get 2;广.This case can be considered as that the path P is shift 
right from the vertical axis. 
2. For D^ = 0, = 0 is a horizontal line in the (2:2, Zi) system. Thus 
Ij have none or only one cross point with P. For any (21, Z2) G P， i f 
〈诗,lj{zuZ2) > 0’ else //(21,2:2) = 0. 
Thus we cover all the possible values of Dj and D^. 
R e m a r k 5. The algorithm takes 0{n?) time complexity. 
4.3 Optimal Solution of the Dual 
Using the above algorithms, we have obtained the whole path P(A). After 
getting the investors' budget information, the objective function of the dual 
P O G D ( A ) could be used to find the optimal solution and optimal value 
efficiently. 
W’:2*) = + B%zt' > + Blzl 
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From the process of generating the entire path, we know that as k in-
creases, Z2 increases and zf decreases. Besides, the slope of the path P(A) 
turns flatter as zg increases. Thus we can find only one k that satisfies the 
above constraints. Besides, if ” = ” holds in one of the two constraints, for 
instance, 
Bljzt' + Biz',-'=风 4 + Blzl 
then the points between (zf一i，2;f—i) and (2;^,Z2) along the path P are all 
optimal for the dual problem, thus we have infinite many optimal solutions 
for the dual problem. If both of the two constraints are inequalities, then the 
dual problem has only one optimal solution. 
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Primal Solution and Stability 
of the Core under Two-Period 
Case 
During last chapter, we have examined the two-period investment problem 
from its dual side. We provide an efficient algorithm to solve the dual prob-
lem and through its optimal solution, we give a stable core allocation. Thus 
we have found the solution of the game. However, for investment problems, 
we also want to know the investment policy like which projects we have se-
lected and the exact amount of money we invest on each of them in our 
portfolio, which is the optimal solution of the primal problem. So next step 
we go back to the primal problem and try to solve it using the existing results. 
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5.1 Direct Results 
The optimal solution (21, 22) of problem POGD(入）can be identified by 
the algorithm introduced in last chapter. Once we obtain the dual optimal 
solution, we try to use this result to solve the primal problem. First, we start 
with a simple lemma. 
Lemma 3. Let (zi, Z2) be the optimal solution of problem POGD ( A ) , define 
Uj = 产、,then the defined (z\, 22, u) is an optimal solution for the 
dual problem, 4-1-
This lemma, can be directly proved by the proof of lemma 1. So next step 
we start with the optimal solution of problem 4.1, and try to find 
the optimal solution of the primal problem POG (A) . First, we introduce an 
important and well known fact in linear programming which will be used in 
this part. 
Lemma 4. (Complementary Slackness Conditions) 
Let X and y be primal and dual feasible solutions for problem 
max c^x mill iFy 
s.t. Ax <b and s.t. A^tj > c 
X > 0 
respectively. Then x and y are both optimal if and only if all of the following 
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conditions are satisfied: 
(A — Y2=i ^ik^k) Vi = 0, for each I <i<m 
(Er=i ykAkj — Cj) Xj = 0’ for each l < j < n 
For our model POG ( A ) and it's dual, if {zi,z2, u) is defined as in lemma 
3，the complementary slackness conditions can be written as: 
( 
{(Ij^ j - y)uj = 0, j = 1,2, ...,m 
m 
((1 - X)Bl - E = 0, 
[Tj - D]zi - Dp2 - qjUj)xj = 0’ j = l , 2 , . . . , m 
Prom the above conditions, it is easy to get the following result: 
L e m m a 5. Suppose {zi,Z2,u) is one of the optimal solutions achieved by 
algorithm 1 and 2. Let 
A = {j\rj - D]z, - > 0 } B = {j\rj - D]z, - D]z2 < 0} 






Proof. For any j e A, Vj - — D^Z2 > 0, we have Uj = ( � � 
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0 in the optimal solution, then by complementary slackness conditions it 
implies that for any optimal primal solution Xj, we have that Xj = y/qj-
For any j G B, r-j — D]zi — D^Z2 < 0 , Uj 二 0, then we know that Djzi + 
D'jZ2 + QjUj > 7j. Therefore, by the complementary slackness conditions it 
implies that for any optimal primal Xj, Xj = 0. • 
5.2 Find the Optimal Solutions of the Primal 
Problem 
The above lemma only provides the expression of Xj by y when j G AU B. 
Define set C = { j : Vj — Djzi — Djz2 = 0}. Next step we want to find 
the expression for Xj when j E C and consequently solve the optimal y and 
Xj. First, for set C = { j i , j2, • • •, jh}, suppose < # < • • • < in 
Jl J2 
increasing order. Let Ci = JljeA 吾，�2 = J^jeA 令’ then J^jeA = �俱 
XjeA^jD^j = C2y. Thus the two budget constraints of the primal problem 




Notice that since the primal problem always has feasible solution and is 
bounded above, strong duality holds. Therefore, the complementary slack-
ness conditions always have feasible solutions. Once a pair of primal and 
dual feasible solutions satisfy the complementary slackness conditions, they 
are both optimal. Next step, we try to find the optimal solutions for the pri-
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rnal problem when the dual optimal solution is {zi, 22). The optimal solution 
of the dual problem can be divided into three cases: 
Case 1 Zi > Z2 = 0 
Case 2 Zi = 0, 22〉0 
Case 3 〉0, 22 > 0 
We discuss the three cases separately. 
Case 1: zi > 0, z'l = 0. To solve the optimal solution for primal problem 
is equivalent to find a feasible solution to the following problem: 
明 + ⑷工jD]沾-X讽 
< 
QjXj < y for all j ^ C 
Xj > 0 for all j e C 
\ 
Under this case, since the original problem always has feasible and optimal 
solution, we just need to solve the following problem: 
min C2y + E j e c 
(5.1) 
QjXj < y for all j E C 
Xj > 0 for all j eC 
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For any optimal solution of this problem, it satisfies all the constraints in case 
1，thus forms a feasible solution of primal problem under this case. Further-
more, by complementary slackness conditions, we can prove its optimality. 
Assume < ^ < 十i • Then we have the following result. 
Uk — Cl — L^y^  + i 
Theorem 7. One of the optimal solution for primal problem under case 1 is 
given by 
. ‘ f o r j e A o r j e C , ^ 
0, / o r j e C / ^ � o r j e B 
= (1 - A)邱 
—Cl + D} Iq^ 
where ko is the minimizer of 
min id + ^V^j ) 
< j fco •‘ 
Prvof. If {x*,y*) is an optimal solution for the problem, then there exists a 
k and an optimal solution (x, y*) for the same y*) such that qjXj — y* for all 
j G Ck/k and Xj = 0 for all j G C/Ck- Furthermore, since for any j G C / , 
p\x . 
if Xj > 0, we can always bring it down to 0 and increase y by to make 
the new solution still feasible for problem 5.1 and the objective value smaller 
than before. So we get that k < K, Under this setting, since Xj = y/qj if 
j e Ck and 
工 ， 
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the feasible region for y becomes 
(1 - A)风 < Y < (1 -入)风 
+ Ejeau{k+i} D]/qj — ~ Ci + Zjec, D]/qj . 
Notice that the corresponding objective becomes 
min Ic,y + ； ^ D^^y/q, + ^ (1 - A )风 - ( c i + ^ D]/q,)y \， 
I jeCk k L jeCk. �J 
which is a linear function of y, the optimal solution of y should be either the 
upper or the lower bound of the feasible region with respect to /c, both of 
which are in the form 
(1 -入)邱 
It's easy to check that the corresponding optimal value is 
Notice that for each k, 
{ y = (1-鄉 i 
� X j = y/qj, if j e Ck 
Xj = 0, i f j e C / C k 
\ 
is a feasible solution of the problem, we know that the optimal value is indeed 
rnin 厂 1 \ � … + ^ j /Qj 1 
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• 
This optimal solution is a kind of greedily filling Xj's in set C by the 
increasing order of Z)J/Dj. Thus we select the project in set C with more 
capital requirement in period 1 and less capital requirement in period 2 to 
make the constraint for period 1 tight. 
Corollary 1. The optimal value of dual problem can also be equivalently 
represented as 
which is a decreasing function with respect to set C. 
Proof. Since for any set S we can generate 
‘ y = (1-鄉， 
y ci+EjesDj/qj 
{ = y/Qj^ if j e 5 
� X j = 0, if j e C/S 
correspondingly as a feasible solution, we can conclude the result similarl}^ 
The decreasing property with respect to set C automatically follows from its 
representation. • 
From the second representation, as we select more projects in our port-
folio, and the corresponding value of the risk y declines. It coincides with 
the pooling effect that more diversified projects in the portfolio will bring 
down the risk of the portfolio. Besides, we can obtain a range for all possi-
l)le optimal y via identifying all possible k,s. Since all the optimal solutions 
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will result in the same optimal value, the difference between two optimal 
solutions includes the difference in both the expected return and the risk, 
the decreasing of one results in the increasing of the other, thus reflects the 
balance of expected return and risk. 
Case 2: zi = 0, 22 > 0. This case is equivalent to find a feasible solution 
for the following: 
< 
QjXj < y 
\ 
This case is similar to case 1. We do the similar analysis as in case 1 and 
choose the projects in set C by the decreasing order of So we just 
go directly to case 3. 
Case 3: zi = 0, 22 > 0. It is equivalent to find a feasible solution for 
f 
C2y + j:^cAD� = � l — X)B2N 
< 
QjXj < y 
Xj>0 
\ 
Case 3 is greatly different from case 1 and case 2 because we need to make 
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both of the budget constraints tight. To find the optimal solution under case 
3, we first keep one constraint always be satisfied, and find the possible range 
for y using the second constraint, then gradually find the optimal solution 
for Xj and y. For any k fixed, we include the first k projects in our portfolio. 
All of these projects except the k-th project are invested with the maximum 
amount y/qj. Since we selected the projects with the smallest D'^ / D j ratios, 
this portfolio leads to the smallest budget requirement in period 2. So we 
have 
0 < (1 - - Ly + E D}若)< Dl念 
C2y + E + f ( 1 - X ) B j , — c,y — E < ( 1 - X讽 
、 j=l \ J=1 ) 
From this we can get a region y e A^ for this particular k. Note the Xj 
for j e C and the fixed k as Xj. 
For any k' fixed, we can also build up a portfolio that includes the k'-th 
project till the h-th project. All of these projects except the k'-th project 
are invested with the maximum amount y/qj. This portfolio will leads to the 
biggest budget requirement in period 2. Thus we have 
( h \ 
< V 广… V \ 
� j=k'+i ” \ j=k'+i " ) 
From this we can get a region y G Bk' for this particular k'. Note the Xj for 
j ^ C and the fixed k’ as x'j'. 
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If for any k and k', we have Ak A + 0, then for any y e A^ H Bk' 
we can find a(k, k',y) G [0’ 1], and for any j e C, Xj 二 a{k, y)x'j + (1 -
a(k, k\ y))xj', such that both of the equality hold. Thus the range for all 
optimal y can be expressed as 
y e ^ = {uAk) n (uB^/) 
For any y in this range, we can solve Xj's such that (x, y) form an optimal 
solution for the primal problem under case 3. 
5.3 Relationship between 入 and the Core 
The parameter 入 can be considered as the risk attitude of the whole group. 
However, different investors in this group may hold different opinions about 
risk, some are more sensitive towards risk, while others are less sensitive 
to risk level, so they may need to negotiate within the group to determine 
the 入 for the whole group. If it is the case, we can not look A as a fixed 
number for anyone or any group, so next step we want to analyze how will 
this 入 affect our game and the core allocation. The process is like that: we 
first analyze the efficient frontier for the whole group, which is a function of 
expected return and total risk. Then we use this efficient frontier to build a 
connection between 入 and the core to get our final result. 
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5.3.1 Tracing out the efficient frontier 
Every possible investment portfolio has its risk and expected return, thus 
can be plotted in the risk-ret urn space. The set of all such possible portfolios 
defines a region in this space. Markowitz first introduced the term “ efficient 
frontier" which is the line along the upper edge of this region. Any point 
ill this line represents a portfolio with the minimum risk for a given level of 
return. Conversely, for a given level of risk, the point lying on the efficient 
frontier represents the portfolio with the best possible return. In this chapter, 
we first use the second explanation to trace out the efficient frontier for our 
model. Then we use the efficient frontier to analyze the stability of the core. 
Genera te the Ent ire Risk-Return Frontier 
We still assume that D j / D ^ s are sorted in increasing order. Our primal 
problem is equivalent to: 
入 m 
max max -y + > r.x.； 
y X 1 - A ^ J J i=i 





Xj > 0 j = 1,2，... ’m. 
54 
CHAPTER 5. PRIMAL SOLUTION AND STABILITY OF THE CORE 
UNDER TWO-PERIOD CASE 
This problem can be separated to a two phases problem: 
m 
P I : f(y) = m a x y ^ V j X j 





Xj > 0 j = 1，2’... ’m. 
and 
P2 : v{N, A) = max - — + /( ' " ) 
y>o 1 — A 
Now we consider the problem PI, it just fits the second explanation of 
the efficient frontier, as y is a fixed risk level. The dual problem of PI can 
be written as: 
niin B}jZi + B%Z2 + y E7=i 以j. 
s.t. DjZi + D�Z2 + QjUj > Tj j = 1 ,2 , . . . ,m (5-2) 
Zi ,Z2 ,Uj > 0 j = 1,2, . . . , m . 
Reformulate the above dual problem, we get 
min Bkzi + Blz^ + y ( � 广 印 : ， ) + 
(5.3) 
s.t. Zi^Z2 > 0 
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L e m m a 6. The two linear programs 5.2 and 5.3 have the same optimal 
solution for {z\, Z2), and the same optimal value. 
Proof. Note the optimal value of problem 5.2 and 5.3 as Vi and V2, respec-
tively. If (21, Z2, u) is an optimal solution for problem 5.2, then for each 
j e {1，2,... ,771}’ from Djzi + D'jZ2 + QjUj > rj and uj > 0, we know that 
U j � ^ ^ , It follows 
^ — (h 
If (z'l, Z2) is an optimal solution for the problem 5.3，then if we define u'j = 
— — — ^ ~ ~ ^ ~ , it follows directly that u'j > 0. Furthermore, for any j G 
{ 1 , 2 , . . . , 771}, observing that 
T — r)i _ r)2 
D]z[ + + > D]z[ + D^ + g / 广 “ 力 — = � 
qj 
{z{, z'2, u') forms a feasible solution for problem 5.2. It follows that 
= Bs,z{ + Bs�么 + y Y ： ( � � � > . 
j=i 力 
Therefore, it must be the case that Vi = V2. For any optimal solution of 5.3 
(?i’4)， 
Qj 
forms an optimal solution of problem 5.2. And for any optimal solution of 5.2 
(2i，22，w), (^1, Z2) forms an optimal solution of 5.3. • 
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For 
Lj = {(^1,22)1^^ - D^zi - D]z2 = 0} j = 1 ,2 , . . . , rn 
and Lo = {(21,22)^1 = 0} Lm+i = {(21,^2)^2 = 0} 
Define 
s = {Lj n Lj>\j + 0 < j，/ < m + l } n RX 
Notice that by our assumptions, every two lines of L^, j G { 0 , 1 , . . . , m + 1 } 
have at most one cross point, so the set S has at most = (爪 (爪+ 1 ) 
points. For set S, we have the following result. 
L e m m a 7. The optimal solution of 5.3 can always be found within the set 
S. 
Proof. The lines Lj, j G {0,1,2，...，m + 1} split the feasible region R2 into 
polytopes. Within each polytope, the objective function of problem 5.3 is a 
linear function, therefore it can only achieve the optimal value at the corner 
points of the polytope. (If 5.3 has multiple optimal solutions, at least one of 
them is at the corner point of the polytope.) All of the corner points form 
just the set S. This proves the lemma. • 
Let 
幻= L——-——=•(2:1,勿)G s 
j=i qj .7=1 
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Then the objective function of problem 5.3 becomes 
The set S = {(21,22,23)1(21,^2) G S} has at most = 广+ ” 
points. Note them as 2 � / c = 1, 2 , . . . , with the increasing order of 
which means zl < z^ < - •• < 丨.Then we have the following result for the 
efficient frontier. 
Theorem 8. The efficient frontier is an increasing and concave function of 
the risk level y. 
Proof. For any z^ G 5, f(y) = + Bjjzg + yz^ represents a straight line 
in the {y, f{y)) system, min f{y) is the lower bound of all these lines, which 
y 
forms the efficient frontier for our model. Since for any y, the coefficient of 
f{y) and y is 23, which by definition is always positive. Besides, it is obvious 
that the lower bound of a series of lines is concave. • 
From the proof of the above theorem, we know that the entire efficient 
frontier can be traced out by observing all the lines and find the lower 
bound of them. 
The efficient frontier has at most \S\ - 1 break points. Note the set of all 
the break points of the efficient frontier as 6 . If any point of this efficient 
frontier (y, f{y)) is not in Q, it must satisfy 
f(y) = + B%zl + 
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f(y) 
zk丨 and zk+i are both opt 
. 产 zk is dpt 
/ I I 
i I . I 
Yk-i Yk y 
Figure 5.1: Efficient Frontier for Two-Period Case 
for a particular k, that means z^ is the optimal solution for the dual problem 
of PI. Besides, there is a region that when y e Ik, z^' is the optimal 
solution for the dual problem of PI. For any z^, z '^ G S, define Ik,k' as 
Thus 2& is optimal for problem 5.3 with risk y is equivalent to y G f\'Jk’k� 
Define / � = r\k'Ik’k', it is easy to see that Ik is a closed interval or null set. 
Then for any y e h, the line f{y) = B�zi + B^z^-hyz^ is below every other 
line within this region, thus z^ is the corresponding optimal solution. 
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if (y, f{y)) G 6 , there are two points 2;左'and both satisfy 
f{y) = + Blz^' + yzl' = Bj^zf+1 + Zfe叫 + "4'+1’ 
this is the joint of and Ik>+i-
Now we get a function of the expected return and the risk. It can be seen 
from the function that within each interval Ik, f{y) is a linear function of y 
and increasing with the slope z^. 
The Re la t ionsh ip between the Efficient Frontier, A and Core of the 
G a m e 
For our original model and its dual, the optimal solution is related to the 
value of A, and it can be written as 
•u(iV’ A) = max f{y) - j ^ y 
y>0 丄一/\ 
and the efficient frontier {(y, f(y)),y > 0} is described as 
f{y) = + Bl4 + yzl 
2知es 
which is piece wise linear path with at most — 1 many break points and 
51 many linear pieces. Suppose the y index value of the break points are 
2/1,'以2，..., sorted in increasing order, and note yo = Q and 互! = +oo, 
then the A>th linear piece is between i/k-i and y^ with the slope zg, which is 
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N v , . are both opt 
z IS opt . . i ' ' - - — 
\ z; X 义 e ’opt 
^ A = -^,opt 广 U+23 I+Z3 ； 
I+Z3 
丄 ^ 
— yk.i n y — yk-i Vk y 
Figure 5.2: Relationship between 入 and core of the game 
in decreasing order since the path is a concave path. Noticing that optimal 
solutions for 
A 
”(TV，A) 二 max f(y} — - - y 
y>0 丄一A 
correspond to tangent lines of the path {(y, f{y)),y > 0} with slope we 
have the following: 
Theorem 9. Define sq = +00 and <S|云|+i = 0. If A = the problem 
v{N, A) has multiple optimal solutions with the value of y be any point within 
range {yk-i.yk), and z^ lies in the core of the game. If < A < t ^ , 
1 十 上 十 Z f j 
there is unique optimal solution for y as y = yk, while z^ and both lies 
in the core of the game. 
Proof. At the optimal point, we have 
T ⑷去0 
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If 
. Zo K X A = ^ Zo = 
1 + 3 1 —入 
we have f(y) = Bj^z'j + BfjZ^ + yzg, that means z^ is the optimal solution 
for problem 5.3, so from the previous analysis we know y G {yk-\,yk)- If 
� < Y ^ < 4 
the optimal value is achieved at the breakpoint, both z^ and 2；…are the 
optimal solutionsw for problem 5.3, so we have y = y^. • 
From the proof we know that for any fixed 入，it corresponds to one or 
two dual optima] solutions in our efficient frontier. It is the same as the core 




In this chapter, we discuss the general multi-period cooperative investment 
problem with risk involved. For each investor, there is a concave risk utility 
function, which includes the original linear risk utility function case. That 
means when the risk becomes higher, the investor turns to be more sensitive 
to it. We prove that there exists a unique risk price which is common for 
all investors, thus the model can be transformed to our original multi-period 
model. Besides, the common risk price can be reached through a negotiation 
process even when the utility functions can not be fully described. We also 
give a modified simplex method to solve the dual LP problem for fixed risk 
level which can therefore be used to locally trace out the return-risk frontier 
and is useful to the negotiation process. 
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6.1 Common Risk Price and the Negotiation 
Process with Concave Risk Utility 
In this section, we assume that the projects are normalized, that is, J2t=i 二 
1. We assume that for any j , the Dj + 0, which means there is no project, 
or in other words, each of them needs initial endowment at certain periods. 
Then x^ is exactly the total amount of money invested on project j, 
111 general, different person has different risk utilities, and usually it's a 
concave function instead of pure linear function. Suppose for each investor 
i, the utility function associated with the expected revenue share and the 
share of risk level (3i is ai-\-Ui{Pi). Ui is assumed to be a C^ concave decreasing 
function with Ui{0) = 0. Then the cooperative game can be formulated as: 
y{S) = + Ui(Pi)) 
ies 
m 
S.t. ^ ^ Q j = ^ ^ TjXj 
ies j=i 
i€S 
QjXj < y j = 1,2, 
N 
Xj > 0 j = l,2’...，m 
cvi, ft > 0 for all i € S, 
The feasible region of x is compact since for each j, there exists a tj such that 
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D^ j > 0, and consequently Xj < Bg /D^j . And although the feasible region 
of y is not compact, the optimal y would not go beyond maxj qjB^g /D^-, 
therefore it's essentially compact too. 
6.1.1 Existence of Common Risk Price and Core 
First, since Xj is bounded, y is also bounded, therefore the feasible region 
is convex and compact, thus this concave maximization problem always has 
solution. By checking the KKT condition of the above problem, we can ob-
serve that for optimal solution (a*, /?*, x*, y*), there exists a common constant 
p > 0 which can be interpreted as a common risk price such that u•(/?*) = —p 
if f3* > 0 and n'^ (O) < —p if = 0. In both cases, —p is always a subgradient 
of Ui{x) in the range x > 0, when x = P*. 
The KKT condition of the original problem guarantees that (a*, a;*, y*) 
is still optimal for the problem: 
v{S) = max^(a, + u^ip；) — _ P：)) 
ies 
m 
s-t- JZ^i 二 Yl^j工:i 
ies j=i 
T A = y 
ies 
QjXj < Vj j = l’2’...’m 
m 
Xj > 0 = 1,2’...，m 
ai, ft > 0 for all i e S. 
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Notice that under the constraint, if we define W = Xlies 叫(A*)’ the objective 
function is exactly 
N 
y^ rjXj -py + W + py* • 
j=i 
Then (x* should also be the optimal solution for problem 
rn 
V* = max —py + ^ rjXj 
s.t. QjXj < y J. = 1，2’ …’ m 
m 
Y^ D]xj < B^ t = 1 ,2 , . . . ,T 
Xj > 0 j = 1，2,…，TTi 
Since y* should never be zero, then at least there exists one > 0，the 
common price p must be —uJ(/?*), which is unique. Consequently, we can 
conclude the above result in the following theorem. 
Theorem 10. For any group of investors each of which has a C^ concave 
decreasing risk utility function, they can always achieve a unique common 
risk price p. Thus the problem is equivalent to our original model. 
Also, for such games the existence of core allocation can be established: 
Theorem 11. For the game with concave utility function, it has nonempty 
core. Besides any dual form core allocation of a certain LP game corresponds 
a core of the game with concave utility function. 
Proof. Suppose the grand coalition is N, from above we know there ex-
ists a unique common risk price p associated with N, and optimal solu-
tion (a*, X*, y*). For any coalition S, note W(S) = X^ies ''^KA*) and 
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y*(S) = Th&s K. From concavity, 
which implies that for any optimal solution of coalition S {af , Pf 
+ < Y^af + 
ies ies ies ies ies 
m 
Suppose the optimal solution of the dual problem of 
m 
v{N) = max —py + ^^ VjXj 
s.t. QjXj < y j = 1,2,..., m 
m 
Y^ D]xj < B^^ , = 1,2，...’了 
Xj > 0 j = 1 , 2 , . . . , ? n , 
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First, we have 
E = 
uJi gn t=i 
m 
= + w + py* = E rjX* - py* + M, + py* 
ieN 
Also, for any S C N, we have that 
T 
Y^i = ； 巧 ; + 叫 ( 從 
ies ies t=i 
m 
> ； (^af + u“"f)). 
ies 
Therefore, by definition the allocation uji for player i is a core allocation of 
the game with concave utility function. • 
6.1.2 Negotiation Process 
Now we analyze how the players negotiate to reach the common acceptable 
risk level. From the previous discussions, we can see that the common risk 
price always exists for each coalition, and it's unique. If we know this common 
risk price, solving the core of the original game is easy since it's equivalent to 
solving the dual LP problem. But in practice this price is usually unknown 
and need to be solved, and even worse, investors usually do not or could not 
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state the exact utility functions associate with risk, instead they can state 
their acceptable risk range if given certain risk price. This setting motivates 
us to consider solving the problem (especially the dual) by tracing out the 
return risk frontier as for two-period problem. The negotiation process would 
be like the following for a given coalition: 
1. Propose a risk level y for the coalition. 
2. Solve the associated dual problem for this fixed y, by LP or other 
algorithms, to get the subgradient of return level with respect to y, 
which can be viewed as a proposed risk price p. 
3. Each person report their own minimum risk tolerance level yi and max-
imum risk tolerance level y[ for the proposed risk price p. 
4. If ^ yi > y�increase y�return to step 2. 
If Yl y'i < '"，decrease y, return to step 2. 
If else, there exists (3i G [？/i，?/;], ^ ^ ft = y and u\(j3i) = —p. This p is 
the common risk price. 
5. Solve the dual problem associated with p, and the original primal prob-
lem with y given. Output the allocation rule presented above. 
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f(y) 
P ^ ^ ^ ^ J ^ — — 
/f 1 I 
The above model does not include the case in which different investors 
have totally different risk attitude, that is, different A's. In that case, the 
person with lower 入 will try to "sell" risk, and the person with the highest 
A will try to “ buy" risk and act as a insurance provider. And the model has 
to be analyzed carefully with the KKT condition on the subgradients. 
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6.2 Modified Simplex Method 
We consider the multi-period problem: 
入 N 
= max - j Z T x y + � j 冗 j 
s.t. QjXj < y j = 1 , 2 , . . . , i V 
N 
Y ^ D]xj < (1 - \)B^s i = 1 , 2 , . . . , T 
j=i 
Xj > 0 j = 1，2’...，见 








Zt,Uj > 0 t = 1 , . . . j = 1 ,2 , . . . ,m . 
Similar to the two-period case, we can construct the following problem 
T 
mill (1 - 入 ) E ^s^t 
,十 yrn (r广Er=i 咖 + < 丄 (6.2) 
Zt>0 t = l,.,.,T 
L e m m a 8. The two linear programs 6.1 and 6.2 have the same optimal 
solution for (2*)，and the same optimal value. Besides, if we solve 6.2 and 
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get the optimal solution {z*), let u* = — ^^ �*~，then {z*,u*) forms the 
optimal solution for 6.1. 
The proof of this lemma is the same as lemma 1, so we omit it here. 
When T is small, the dual problem can be solved efficiently, for exam-
ple, with ellipsoid method. The number of iteration steps only related to T, 
however the complexity to find gradients/subgradients each step is 0 (m) . 
We can also deal with the problem with modified simplex method. For 
each fixed y, similar to the two period scenario, the dual problem: 
T m 
f{y) = min E Btzt + y E ^ j 
t=i j=i 
T 
s.t. Y^ DjZt + (jjUj > Tj j = 1,2, . . . ,m 
t=\ 
zuiij > 0 i = l，...，T; j = 1,2,…，m, 
can be reformulated as: 
/ r \ + 
T m rj-Y： D]zt 
f{y) = mill Y^Btzt + yY： — ^ 
s.t. Zt>0 t=l,...,T. 
The planes 
t=\ 
split the set R^ into small polytopes, with each extreme point of these poly-
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topes uniquely defined by T many + |B| = T) linearly independent 
equations 
T 
DtjZt = Vj, for all j e A 
and Zt > 0 for all t e B. Since the objective function in the above problem 
becomes linear within each small polytope, it can take optimal value at the 
extreme points of the corresponding polytope. For each small polytope, two 
adjacent extreme points have T — 1 many common equations. 
Based on the above observations, for each fixed y we can design a modified 
simplex method as follows: 
1. Initialize with 2 = 0. 
2. For z with T active linear independent equations given, try to replace 
one of the equations with an inactive equation, find the one with the 
best improvement of the objective value while keeping feasibility. If 
this improvement is positive, go to Step 2. 
3. If after attempting step 2 for all possible T active linear independent 
equations for z, the best improvement is 0，stop. 
4. Output the 2, and 
/ T \ + 
qj 
\ / 
The Interpretat ion: At each step, the equations Zt = 0 represent the 
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periods t with redundant budget, and the equations 
t=i 
represent the projects which do not contribute to the overall risk. By the 
simplex method, we try to correct our prediction of redundant budget period 
and “ risk free" projects locally. 
To solve the original problem, we notice that the function f{y) is concave 
to y, and for each y any optimal solution ^ corresponds to a siibgradient of 
fiy)--
/ T \ + 
m / r, - E D'j^t 
\ / 
We can easily solve the maximization problem of one-dimension concave func-
tion f{y) — by increasing y if subgradient 
/ T \ + 
m rj-ZD'M 
L q 1 - 入 ’ 
\ / 
decreasing y if subgradient 
/ T \ + 
V ~ ^ < — 
u 力 1 — 入 ， 
卜 V / 
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and stopping with y optimal if subgradient 
/ T \ + 
m Tj - E DtjZt 
s ^ t=i _ ^ 
h[ ~ ^ j = 口 . 
The Interpretat ion: The subgradient of f{y) can be viewed as the 
local (market) price of risk for certain risk level, while the value is the 
price of risk for the coalition. When the market price becomes higher, the 
players would "sell" the ability to take risk to the market, or equivalent, the 
players become insurance provider. When the market price becomes lower, 
the players would become more risk sensitive than the market, so they would 
buy insurance to lower their risk level. 
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Other Risk Measures 
In the previous models, we use the loo risk measure to evaluate the risk of 
the entire portfolio. The risk of the portfolio is defined as the maximum risk 
afforded among the projects. And for each project, the risk is defined as 
the expectation of the difference between the real return and the expected 
return. In this chapter, we try to analyze the same cooperative investment 
game under other widely used risk measures. 
7.1 The Downside Risk Measure 
In practice, investors are far more sensitive to downside risks, where the 
return is below the target or expected level, than to the upside potential. 
Therefore, in this section we consider a cooperative game model with the 
downside risk measure. Besides, we consider the total risk of the portfolio 
as the sum of the risk for each project. Assume that each investor i has its 
own risk tolerance A (0 < A < 1), which measures the maximum proportion 
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of initial capital that the investor can afford to lose through the investment. 
T 
The total capital investor i has is Bf = ^ Bu, so the total money investor i 
t=i 
can lose can be expressed by PiBf. For any S C N, the total amount of loss 
they can afford is 
TABT 
ieS 
So the risk tolerance of the sub-coalition S can be defined as 
必jes 
which is the weighted average of the individual risk tolerance according to 
their capital amount. Then the risk constraints of the coalition S C N \s 
ies 
Thus within the risk tolerance of the subgroup S, we try to maximize the 
total expected return. The new TU-game (N~ ^v) is obtained by replacing 
risk measure in the original game with downside risk, and for simplicity we 
merge some coefficients. Therefore, for each sub-coalition, the associated 
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characteristic function is: 
m 
V{S) = max ^ TjXj 
(m Y 
S.t. E E - r,) <psBl 
/ (7.1) 
771 
Z 工 jDtj < J : B I t 二 1，2’ . . . ’T 
j=i ieS 
Xj>0 
7.1.1 Discrete (Finite Scenario) Distributions 
We start with considering the case in which the random payoff vector has 
only finite scenarios set A. Suppose for each scenario a e A, the associated 
payoff vector is Rj. Note the possibility for each scenario a as Pa- Then the 
above optimization problem can be transferred to the following LP problem: 
m 
V{S) = max ^ VjXj 
s.t. Y^ PaZa < 
aeA 
m 
2a + E ^ j i^ j - rj) > 0, VaG A (7-2) i=i 
E j^D'j < E B's. ^ = 
j=i ies 
x , z > 0 
(m. 
where 2a is the artificial variable representing ^ - rj) . 
. J 
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The corresponding dual problem is: 
V(S)= mill ^iPsB^ + E A, E 
t=i ies 
s.t. E XtD'j - E 似丑？ - Tj) > Vj j = 1 ,2 ’ . . . ’ m 
t=i aeA (7.3) 
叩a > Gen V a e /I 
Notice that the dual feasible region is still independent to the coalition 
set 5 , therefore like the standard linear production game, the optimal dual 
solution can be used to generate core allocation: 
Theorem 12. With discrete return distributions, the cooperative investment 
game {N~ is balanced, and has a non-empty core. Furthermore, the core 
of the game uj = (uJi)ieN can be obtained by 
T 
t=\ 
where X*,6*) stands for the optimal solution of the dual problem 7.3 
associate with the grand coalition N. 
Proof. For the grand coalition S = N, hy the strong duality of LP problems 
79 
CHAPTER 7. OTHER RISK MEASURES 
(slater condition), we know that: 
� i 
ies 
ies L (=1 . 
ies 
=V{S). 
For any sub-coalition S', we have: 
ieS' 
- T -
ieS' L t=i _ 
二 C 贼 + 
ieS' t=i ies' 
T 
=Ms'Bl + J^XlY^Bl 
t=i ieS' 
> V(S'), 
where the last inequality follows from the fact that /.i*, A*, is feasible for 
the dual problem with respect to set S'. 
Therefore, we proved that any u defined as above is within the core of 
the game. • 
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7.1.2 General Distributions 
For the general case, there might be infinitely many scenarios, and many 
times the distribution could be continuous. Obviously we could not use 
formulation (7.2) directly. However, any distribution can be estimated with 
a large enough sample because of the large deviation theorem, and in practice 
distributions are discretized into finite scenario cases, with exception to a 
few well studied distributions like Normal Distribution. For those special 
distributions, when the distribution is given, the problem (7.1) is still solvable 
with ellipsoid method since the subgradient of the constraint function can 
be calculated for each instance. Further more, for more specific distribution 
like Normal Distribution, this primal problem can be formulated as a SDP 
problem which can be solved with interior point method (with CVS package 
of Matlab) efficiently because the random constraint is actually a convex 
SDP constraint. With the primal problem solvable, the dual optimal solution 
(/i*,A*) can also be solved accordingly (can use discretized version to solve 
approximately). Therefore we can obtain the core of the game within similar 
fashion like the discrete case. 
Ill general case, to establish the existence of the core, we need to formulate 
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the original primal problem into an infinite dimension LP problem: 
rn 
V(S) = max E TjXj 
s.t. Pa^ a < PsBs 
a€A 
m 
+ ^ XjiR^ - Tj) > 0, V a e ^ (7.4) 
rn. 
E ^J^J 力二 1,2，...，T 
j 二1 ‘ ies 
x,z>0 
(m y 
where is the artificial variable representing ^ 一 r,-) , and sce-
V=i . / 
nario set A is now infinite. 
The corresponding dual problem is: 
V ⑶ = m i l l jli^sB^ + E a, E Bj 
i=\ ieS 
s.t. E - E - Tj) > Tj J = 1’ 2，…•, m 
t=\ ‘ neA (7.5) 
l-l'Pa > Oa, V a G ^ 
which is still an infinite dimension LP problem. 
Since both of the feasible regions are compact (under Borel Measure) con-
vex sets, and both problems are (strongly) feasible and bounded (above/below), 
strong duality still holds in the infinitely dimension case[7]. Also the dual 
feasible region is still independent to the coalition set S, therefore, like the 
standard linear production game, the optimal dual solution can be used to 
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generate core allocation: 
Theorem 13. The cooperative investment game {N~^v) is balanced, and 
has a non-empty core. Furthermore, the core of the game to = (tOi)ieN can 
be obtained by 
T 
t=i 
where ("*’A*’ 沪)stands for the optimal solution of the dual problem 7.5 
associate with the grand coalition N. 
The proof is exactly parallel to the case with discrete distribution, so we 
omit here. 
7.2 Coherent Risk Measure and CVaR 
Downside Risk Measure is still subject to many criticisms, especially it lacks 
the property “Translation Invariance", which requires that, if a random vari-
able is shifted linearly the corresponding risk measure is subject to the same 
linear shifting. In practice, a risk measure following the following properties 
(which follows from common sense) are preferred: 
A risk measure p{Z) on the outcome Z\ 
• Monoton ic i ty : If the outcomes Zi > then > 
• Sub-addit ivity: For any Zi and Z2, p{Zx + Z2) < p[Zi) + ^(^2). 
• Positive Homogeneity: For any positive scalar a � 0 and outcome 
Z, p{aZ) = aZ. 
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• Translation Invariance: For any shifting a, we have that p{Z + a)= 
p{Z) + a. 
Any risk measure satisfying the above four conditions is called Coherent 
Risk Measure. One of the most famous class of Coherent Risk Measure is the 
Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) which measures the loss associated with 
the choice x, while ignoring the lowest /^-probability losses. This risk mea-
sure has recently been well studied by R. Tyrrell Rockafellar and Stanishlav 
Uryasev [15] etc and been applied by numerous researchers. 
The /3-CVaR can be defined with the following: Suppose the lose asso-
ciated with decision x and random event ^ is / ( x , { ) and (3 is the target 
probability (the probability of the lower side tail which we ignore), is 
M^) == mij^z + - 计 
zeR 丄一 
For our model, the associated lose to decision x (for coalition S) is 
m 
f ( x , R) = — 工jRj, where R is the random return vector. Therefore, the 
corresponding /?-CVaR is 
1 1 
M工)=mill z + - R ) - z)+] = min 2： + - - E [ { z — / ( x , R))—. 
zeH — p zeti 丄—p 
For any constraint (j)fj{x) < c, it can be replaced by — f[x, /?))"] < 
c and z G R. Therefore, the characteristic cost function for coalition S with 
/5-CVaR, risk constraint can be formulated as: 
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m 
V(S) = max Y^ TjXj 
3 = 1 
1 f rn Y � 
S.t. z + -^E [z+Y：工 jRi < PsBs 
\ • / (7.6) 
m 
E ^jD] < E BI t = 口,…，T 
ies 
Xj > 0 
We note the associated game as (A^ ,^ v). 
Same as before, in the case that the distribution is discrete with scenario 
set {a : a E A} (each with associated return vector the above problem 
can be reformulated as standard LP problem: 
m 
V{S) = max � j 
s.t. E PaZa < PsBs 
aeA 
m 
Za + Z + E ^J^y > 0, V a G ^ (7.7) 
771. 
E XjDj < Z BI t = 口, .../T 
j=i ies 
Xj.Za > 0,Vj,a 
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The corresponding dual problem is: 
min + E A, E 
t=i ies 
s.t. E XtDtj — E OaR"； >rj j 二 1, 2 ’ . . .，m 
aeA 
f i P a > { l - P ) O a . y a e A (7.8) 
“ 二 
X>0 
By the dual formulation, noticing that the optimal dual solution for the 
grand coalition S is always feasible for any sub coalition S' Q S, as before 
Theorem 14. The cooperative investment game {N^^ v) is balanced, and has 
A non-empty core. Furthermore, the core UJ = (UJI)IEN of the game (N^, v) 





Conclusion and Future Work 
In this thesis, we extend the model of loo risk measure of Cai et al [3] to the 
multi-period cooperative investment model with risk involved, and discuss 
this model from both the game theoretic prospect and the algorithmic point 
of view. Our main contributions are: 
1. We established the existence of core allocation for the cooperative game 
with linear risk utility, under /qo risk measure, downside risk measure, 
and coherent risk measures. 
2. We further established the existence of core allocation for the game with 
concave risk utility with loo risk measure. We showed that there is a 
unique risk price p which can be obtained through a natural negotiation 
process even if the utility functions are not explicitly given. The core 
allocation and the optimal investment plan will be obtained during this 
process once the optimal price is reached. Also, the original game is 
equivalent to the linear game with this risk price (with the addition of 
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some constant revenue/payment for each person). 
3. We analyzed the two period special case in detail, established an O(m^) 
scheduling type algorithm for obtaining both the dual and primal op-
timal solutions. Also, we examine the relationship between the risk 
level, the maximum possible return with this risk level constraint, and 
the core of the game by tracing out the efficient frontier. 
4. For the general multi-period model with linear risk measure, we provide 
a modified simplex method which only searches through at most C二 
many basic feasible solutions to solve for the dual optimal with fixed 
risk level. This can be further applied to solve subproblems in the 
negotiation process. 
There are still many questions left open, which will be the future work 
directions: 
1. For general concave utility risk measure (for example, not differen-
tiable), establish the existence of common risk price arid core allocation 
by KKT condition for subgradients. Also, consider other risk measures 
for the concave utility risk measure. 
2. Consider the online version decision for the cooperative game when 
allowing return in each period to be reinvested. 
3. How to speed up the negotiation process. 
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